Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Identity: Two objects are never identical. Identity is a single object, to which may be referred to with two different terms. The fact that two descriptions mean a single object may be discovered only in the course of an investigation.

_____________
Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
II 114
Self-identity/(s)>Schmidentity/Identity/Field: true identity is only self-identity. - It is not enough when the extensions of the other predicates (other than "is identical to") are up for grabs.
Less than true identity: E.g. congruence: - is an equivalence relation for which substitutivity applies.
Identity/Quine: it is not easy to say which facts about us make it, that "is identical to" and "rabbit" stands for rabbits - and not "belong together" or "are of the same". - And by analogy for temporary stages - inflationism: can in turn accept facts. - (FieldVsinflationism).


_____________
Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Field I
H. Field
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989

Field II
H. Field
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001

Field III
H. Field
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980

Field IV
Hartry Field
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
In
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994


Send Link
> Counter arguments against Field

Authors A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  


Concepts A   B   C   D   E   F   G   H   I   J   K   L   M   N   O   P   Q   R   S   T   U   V   W   Z  



Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-12-18
Legal Notice   Contact   Data protection declaration