Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Identification: A) Identification is the equivalence of two characterizations of an object in which new properties may be attributed to the object. B) Identification is the discovery that an object is a particular element from a set of objects. In this case, the number of initially assumed properties of the object may be reduced. See also specification, background, information.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I, 139f
Identification/Reference object/Intentionality/Geach: Problem: E.g.: "Someone made a derogatory remark about an unnamed person. Mrs. Supanich claims to be that person." - E.g. "Ralph is the person x so that it was the will of the testator that x should inherit his business."
Definition Shakespearian Context/Geach: if any name can be used ("A rose, whatever its name may be, would smell lovely.")
Definition non-Shakespearian context/Geach: not every name can be used because of opacity. - E.g. inheritance: schakespearian. E.g. "Ralph was (one person that) expressly from the testator..." - (here any name can be used). - Even non-extensional contexts can be Shakespearian: E.g. "It is logically and chronologically possible that Caesar was the father of Brutus." - (But not when instead of "Caesar" a designation is used). - We also do not want quantification on "possible names".
I, 145ff
Intentionality/Identification/Intensional Object/Geach: E.g. a fraudster buys a car under a wrong name: Problem: The correct name cannot be assigned. - Solution: identification over time - then ad hoc name possible: "A" ( "Existence introdcution") - "Hutchinson" is not the same person as __ and the plaintiff believed that __ wanted to buy her car - N.B.: wrong: "Hutchinson is the Person x and the plaintiff believed of x that he wanted to buy her car" (then the plaintiff would have lost). - ((s) identification not with "the buyer", then the purchase would have been achieved, but misidentification: then no purchase.)
I 148f
Identity/Intentionality/Intentional Objects/Geach: Problem: de re "in relation to someone .." - "... Hob and Nob believe that she is a witch" - presupposes that one and the same person is meant. - Same problem as "There is a horse that he owes me" (which). - To refer to indeterminate things often means to refer in an undefined way to something specific. - Problem: Quantification does not help: "Hob thinks a witch has blinded Bob's mare and Nob wonders if she (same witch) killed Cob's sow." - The range of the quantified sentence part seems to be fully within the earlier dependent context, on the other hand it covers something of the later context. - This cannot be represented in a logical schema at all. - Problem: Anapher: "she" or "the same witch" is tied to an antecedent: "the only one ..."
Best solution: Hob thinks that the (one and only) witch which is F, blinded Bob's mare, and Nob wonders if the witch who is F has killed Cob's sow. - ((s) additional property F). - N.B.: the sentence is true if a suitable interpretation of the property F is true. - ((s) Otherwise the sentence is false because of the non-existence of witches.)

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Gea I
P.T. Geach
Logic Matters Oxford 1972

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26