|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.|
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|Frank I 38ff
I/Wittgenstein: Object-use by means of external characteristics: To erroneously believe a bump on the forehead - subject-use: immediately, no criteria, no self-identification no error possible. - Genitive subjectivus: Statement of the person, not about people - no characterization, no error.
Frank I 43
I/Wittgenstein: "I have a toothache" and "He has a toothache" are not values of a common propositional function. - "I have a toothache" denotes no owner.
Hintikka I 99
Nature/property/possession/Wittgenstein: de facto, but not essential relationship.
The relation of possession is not part of the essence of objects. One of these objects is also the empirical ego.
In this sense, Wittgenstein says: "The solipsism coincides with pure realism".
I/WittgensteinVsDescartes "I" has no outstanding position among the words - it is simply used in the language practice.
I/Tractatus/Wittgenstein: 5631 there is no sense in which in the philosophy can be talked non-psychologically about the ego - the philosophical ego is not the human - not the body - 5.64 it shrinks to a point - to this point reality is coordinated - the subject is the limit of the world - with that it can be shown that solipsism is correct. - But it is not impossible to say it.
Vorlesungen 1930-35 Frankfurt 1989
Das Blaue Buch - Eine Philosophische Betrachtung Frankfurt 1984
Tractatus Logico Philosophicus Frankfurt/M 1960
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994
Jaakko and Merrill B. Hintikka
The Logic of Epistemology and the Epistemology of Logic Dordrecht 1989
J. Hintikka/M. B. Hintikka
Untersuchungen zu Wittgenstein Frankfurt 1996