|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Doctrine of non-possessing/I/self/consciousness/Strawson: (probably not Wittgenstein's position/StrawsonVs): Representative: "OP" (our philosopher): Descartes: the uniqueness of a body should be sufficient to evoke the idea that the experience is attributed to it - it was just unfortunatly expressed in terms of possessing - Our PhilosopherVsDescartes: then it would be inadmissible, to assume an "ego" additionally, whose sole function of this is "possessing" - difference: body has experience causally, contingently.
"Ego" has them necessarily, conceptually (wrong) - Solution/Our Philosopher: only things whose possession is logically transferable, can ever be possessed - experiences are then no ownership of the subject - StrawsonVsOur Philosopher: is using himself the false possession term.
Actually our experience in this particular sense are our own, and only identifiable by that - StrawsonVsDescartes/VsOur Philosopher: there are not two uses of "I".
From particular experience of the subject arises not the necessity of a self-concept._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Einzelding und logisches Subjekt Stuttgart 1972
Analyse und Metaphysik München 1994
Die Grenzen des Sinns Frankfurt 1981