|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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I/objective self/Nagel/Stalnaker: I: when someone says I’m RS it seems that the person represents a fact - I 21 and it is an objective fact, whether this is true or false - no matter what the speaker thinks. - Problem: our concept of an objective world seems to leave no room for such a fact. - A complete description of the world as it is in itself will not pick out any particular person as me - it does not tell me who I am! - Semantic diagnosis: attempts a representation of index words or self-localization - NagelVssemantic diagnosis: this does not hit the mark - StalnakerVsVs: simply homophonic truth condition. - Problem: what is the content? - The content (information) in indexical expressions is not transported by the truth conditions - the speaker might not have known the date and place and yet have believed what he said - the listener as well, and yet have understood the expression. - Nagel: anyway Vs ontological self-objectification._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ways a World may be Oxford New York 2003