|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|Frank I 50ff
ShoemakerVsHume: 1st shows no more than that, as I find myself, I can not know - the second premise is false: although there is no index-free description, that does not prove that I would need such. >Self-identification.
For identification the possibility of errors is necessary - but this is not given in the case of the self. >Incorrigibility.
Anyway there is regress in self-identification.
Hume did not deny self-consciousness. >Self-consciousness.
Self-consciousness/Shoemaker: no kind of perception! (Rorty ditto).
Pain: no (private) object, a person is not pain, and it is not painful, but one feels pain._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Identity, Cause, and Mind: Philosophical Essays Expanded Edition 2003
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994