|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|McGinn I 86f
Russell: characterizes as "I as a number of classes of mental particulars" (as opposed to "needlepoint-I").
The temporal identity then boils down to saying that there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the ego. The individual states of a person are so connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993
Wahrheit und Falschheit
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001