|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Bertrand Russell on I, Ego, Self - Dictionary of Arguments
McGinn I 86f
Russell: characterizes "I as a number of classes of mental particulars" (as opposed to "needlepoint-I").
The temporal identity then boils down to saying that there are certain relationships between the mental qualities of the ego. The individual states of a person are so connected by something like memory, causal continuity, psychological similarity. >Temporal identity._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
B. Russell/A.N. Whitehead
Principia Mathematica Frankfurt 1986
The ABC of Relativity, London 1958, 1969
Das ABC der Relativitätstheorie Frankfurt 1989
The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912
Probleme der Philosophie Frankfurt 1967
"The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", in: B. Russell, Logic and KNowledge, ed. R. Ch. Marsh, London 1956, pp. 200-202
Die Philosophie des logischen Atomismus
Eigennamen, U. Wolf (Hg), Frankfurt 1993
On the Nature of Truth and Falsehood, in: B. Russell, The Problems of Philosophy, Oxford 1912 - Dt. "Wahrheit und Falschheit"
Wahrheitstheorien, G. Skirbekk (Hg), Frankfurt 1996
Problems in Philosophy. The Limits of Inquiry, Cambridge/MA 1993
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
The Mysteriouy Flame. Conscious Minds in a Material World, New York 1999
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001