Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself. C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon:
Richard Rorty
IV 67
"Consciousness"/Rorty: instead of consciousness we should say "I": the
Def "I" consists of the mental states of a person.
"I"/Rorty: the "I" does not have, but is beliefs. The brain does not have synapses, but is made of them.
"I think"/Kant:... it has to be able to accompany all my ideas: Rorty: just a method. It means having a conviction or a desire automatically means to have many. No "Synthesis", but simply the fact that they belong to one and the same network.
Frank I 24 ~
I/Rorty: can be analyzed away - SB: incorrigible - but not specifically epistemic or specifically ontological - Rorty pro nominalism: properties are only assigned to the things through linguistic practice, not by themselves! - Like Foucault: "I" could go out of fashion


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-08-16