|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
"Consciousness"/Rorty: instead of consciousness we should say "I": the
Def "I" consists of the mental states of a person.
"I"/Rorty: the "I" does not have, but is beliefs. The brain does not have synapses, but is made of them.
"I think"/Kant:... it has to be able to accompany all my ideas: Rorty: just a method. It means having a conviction or a desire automatically means to have many. No "Synthesis", but simply the fact that they belong to one and the same network.
Frank I 24 ~
I/Rorty: can be analyzed away - SB: incorrigible - but not specifically epistemic or specifically ontological - Rorty pro nominalism: properties are only assigned to the things through linguistic practice, not by themselves! - Like Foucault: "I" could go out of fashion_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994