|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.|
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|Frank I 398ff
Extra-sense/I/PerryVsCastaneda: can be recognized by others in the same way, does not explain the difference.
I/he/reference/relation/sense/meaning: difference: Quasi-indicator attributes reference, but does not establish it.
I/Castaneda/Perry: not replaceable by specific labeling, when behavior is explained - "key index word" - Problem: same sentence, but different speaker: false belief "I'm making a mess ...". - Incorrect solution: "And I am the one": again a new index word. - "Lack of conceptual component" does not help: I can believe that it is me, with no specific concept of me. - False: Labelling: "the one who makes the mess" does not help, because no connection to me.
Belief/I/Perry: Solution: distinction belief-state/belief-object. - E.g. event starts at 12:00 - that means, "now!" or "already finished" or "still time". - Subject: the event beginning at 12:00 - state: "now" - specific labeling without an index is not enough.
I/individuation/Perry: The following conditions are not enough: Propositions de re, de dicto, additional conceptual feature localization in space and time, relativization on people and places, two different descriptions without "I" - like Castaneda: 'I' is not replaceable.
Time/Person-Proposition: does not make me different from the others: "J.P. yesterday at the super market" is just as true for others. - judgement context = opinion context: "The event begins now" is true at 12:00 - does not help. - True/False: does not help: that mountain A is higher than B, may be true, but does not lead to the right path. - There is nothing what all have in common. - Solution: lost wanderers in the same opinion state (individuated by index words), but not of the same opinion.
J. R. Perry
Identity, Personal Identity, and the Self 2002
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994