|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
|V 239 ff
I, Ego, Self/empirical I/Pauen: entity of the self-attribution, not homogeneous.
I/Kenny: is a "philosophical nonsense", misunderstanding of the reflexive pronoun.
I/Minsky: variety of agents, "only useful for the attribution of actions ".
Dennett: apparently direct everyday perception in reality complex interpretation and building of hypotheses. - "I is not independent" opinions and wishes are complexes of memes.
Blackmore: no origin of wishes, but a function of the bundling.
I/Metzinger/Pauen: (following Johnson-Laird): mental models as the basis of our representation of reality. - Top model of the hierarchy: the "reality model".
Subjectivity is attributed to the self-model, embedded in the model of reality. - The model is transparent in terms of content, but not its mechanisms.
"Self"/Metzinger: is a fiction.
I/Fichte/Pauen: ... perpetual change - just pictures, no sense._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001