|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
I/use/Nozick: all semantic facts about what the use of "I" refers to, state necessity de dicto, not de re.
I/synthesis/Nozick: Problem: how do we know that not in any moment a new I is synthesized?
I/unit/self/Nozick: unit is not about the act, which could have produced something else - but as a unified whole the I constitutes itself as capable of having other bodily parts or to lose memories (perhaps all).
I/self: is projected into the future, as comprising certain stages - after the scheme of the next successor the self-concept will be a listing and weighting of dimensions - but no metric (more Next are possible). - Nozick: Thesis: we are choosing partially by ourselves.
I/Nozick: physical descriptions exclude me, because they are not reflexive.
Self/I/Part/Whole/Nozick: a) self as the next successor of each act of synthesis ((s)> Castaneda: volatile egos) - or rather an underlying, enduring self: then rather a whole, less limitations, more unit._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994