Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
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Frank I 506ff
I/Nagel: identification of an objective person as myself; adds no fact to the world - therefore, such identity statements are not understandable for us! - E.g. whether I imagine that my house burns down and I am present or not makes no difference to what one imagines as being the case - EvansVs: an identity statement does not need to make a difference for a spatiotemporal map of the world, but for the manner in which the immediate environment is considered
Nagel III 31
I/objectivism/Nagel: problem of a liberal realist worldview, everyone must admit to themselves that they are a person in a center-less world who is no one else but themselves -
III 33
Distinction I/person/Nagel: allows to ask: how can I be this specific person? - What kind of fact is that? - Problem in the center-less world - Solution: "objective self" which we identify with the "I" - the "self" has the ability to form an idea about the person in the world - in doing so, it refrains from the standpoint of "I am" - the real self excludes the contingent person Thomas Nagel and his perspective as content in its worldview

N I
Th. Nagel
Das letzte Wort Stuttgart 1999

N II
Th. Nagel
Was bedeutet das alles? Stuttgart 1990

N III
Th. Nagel
Die Grenzen der Objektivität Stuttgart 1991

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-27