|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon
|Frank I 412
Vivid name/Kaplan: restriction: there must not only be one a of which I think he is going to be the next president, but a "vivid Name". (> Locke) - Perry: but that does not solve the problem of the essential index word "I".
I/Kaplan: "rigid intension", not individual - "I" designates in each claim in which it occurs, the person who is making the claim.
I ~ 459ff
I/Kaplan: designates always the one who makes the claim (the user). - CastanedaVs: only de re not in a de dicto-references - does not help with the preparation of a network of beliefs.
Problem: the pronoun does not always express the speaker - more of a bound variable: "Stan thinks of me ..." - VsKaplan: the first person aspect is a "grammatical illusion"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Here only external sources; compare the information in the individual contributions.
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994