|I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
C. Self, philosophy the concept of the self cannot be exactly separated from the concept of the I. Over the past few years, more and more traditional terms of both concepts have been relativized. In particular, a constant nature of the self or the I is no longer assumed today. See also brain/brain state, mind, state of mind, I, subjects, perception, person._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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I/You/Brandom: is systematically, not anaphorically linked - one often takes the place of the other.
"It" cannot always be used symmetrically: E.g. Hegel understood Kant's argument, but he has not refuted it - but it is not the actual Tokening he has refuted - he has never heard of this Tokening.
I/Brandom: is not replaceable, because with any other expression [t] circumstances are conceivable that t has a certain proposition, and not me - e.g. sugar trace.
Difference "I will" - "t should" - N.B.: I/Brandom: cannot only be used to assign a definition.
Anscombe: no room for the question who is the one that I know this from (namely me).
No one else can utter the phrase "I'm being threatened by a bear", but everyone can understand it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001