Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

I, philosophy: A) The expression of a speaker for the subject or the person who is herself. The use of this expression presupposes an awareness of one's own person. B) The psychical entity of a subject that is able to relate to itself.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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I 645
I/You/Brandom: is systematically, not anaphorically linked - one often takes the place of the other.
I 646
"It" cannot always be used symmetrically: E.g. Hegel understood Kant's argument, but he has not refuted it - but it is not the actual Tokening he has refuted - he has never heard of this Tokening.
I 766f
I/Brandom: is not replaceable, because with any other expression [t] circumstances are conceivable that t has a certain proposition, and not me - e.g. sugar trace.
I 767
Difference "I will" - "t should" - N.B.: I/Brandom: cannot only be used to assign a definition.
I 770
Anscombe: no room for the question who is the one that I know this from (namely me).
I 779
No one else can utter the phrase "I'm being threatened by a bear", but everyone can understand it.

Bra I
R. Brandom
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000

Bra II
R. Brandom
Begr√ľnden und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26