Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Humean World: a world without causality - phenomenally like our world. See also David K. Lewis, Humean supervenience, Humean mosaic.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

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Humean supervenience/HS/Lewis: Thesis: everything in the world is a large mosaic of local facts - there is a geometry: a system of external relations of spatiotemporal distances between points - at the points we have local qualities, perfectly natural intrinsic properties - everything is an arrangement of qualities (AoQ) - everything supervenes on it. - Important argument: there is no distinction without difference. - That does not mean that two possible worlds could not be different without having a difference in the AoQ - Example 1) possible worlds with Humean supervenience, 2) possible worlds without! - ((s) i.e. Humean supervenience is contingent). - Lewis: for our inner sphere of possibilities there is no such distinction.
Arrow of time: only in one direction - the Humean supervenience has to consider this asymmetry. - Humean supervenience/(s): does not mean here that causality is denied.
Materialism/Humean supervenience/Lewis: materialism is a metaphysics that is to confirm the truth of known physics - Humean supervenience: it may be that the Humean supervenience is true and all our physics wrong.
V 111
Humean supervenience/Coincidence/Lewis: If the Humean supervenience is wrong, there is a fatal counter e.g., which is made by coincidences - then coincidences and coincidence theories do not supervene on facts - Problem: a theory of coincidence is not something that itself may only have a certain chance - (which also says the Principal Principle PP) - an equally likely deviant pattern would lead to an entirely different coincidence theory - right: chances are contingent because they depend on contingent facts, but not because they depended on a theory of coincidence - then the Humean supervenience is maintained.
Schw I 112
Humean supervenience/Lewis/Schwarz: From description which property exists at point X and which at point y we learn which properties these are, thus in which the laws of nature apply.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

D. Lewis
Die Identität von Körper und Geist Frankfurt 1989

D. Lewis
Konventionen Berlin 1975

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd I New York Oxford 1983

D. Lewis
Philosophical Papers Bd II New York Oxford 1986

LwCl I
Cl. I. Lewis
Mind and the World Order: Outline of a Theory of Knowledge (Dover Books on Western Philosophy) 1991

> Counter arguments against Lewis

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-07-22