Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Humean World: a world without causality - phenomenally like our world. See also David K. Lewis, Humean supervenience, Humean mosaic.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 40
Def Humean world/Lewis/Cartwright: a world that is just like ours, except that there are no causal laws in it. ((s) Therefeore there is no cause!) but all temporal sequences of events, properties, etc., and also laws of association are equal - the question what difference do causal laws make in our world is then put succinctly: is there for each possible world a corresponding Humean world? - Cartwright: No, because we are not always able to dispense with causal laws in favor of association - ((s) see above.
I 26
For the connection of laws of association with causal laws, C).
I 41
A Humean world would always be causally homogeneous - if anything increases the probability of something else, it will not be a Humean world.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Car I
N. Cartwright
How the laws of physics lie Oxford New York 1983

CartwrightR I
R. Cartwright
A Neglected Theory of Truth. Philosophical Essays, Cambridge/MA pp. 71-93
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994

CartwrightR II
R. Cartwright
Ontology and the theory of meaning Chicago 1954

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-06-06
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