Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Homophony, philosophy: The special meaning of the concept of homophony in the philosophical discussion about the theory of truth by Tarski is that there must be an additional condition that excludes irrelevant cases. The example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white, but it is also true if on the right side of equivalence stands "... if grass is green". This is due to the weak norm of equivalence ("if and only if") which merely requires that both sides are true or both sides are false. The condition of the homophony now requires (a) that the sentence of the left-hand side is repeated on the right-hand side, and (b) that the sentences on both sides come from the same language. See also Theory of truth, truth conditions. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
S.A. Kripke on Homophony - Dictionary of Arguments
III 338 Homophone Truth Theory: "snow is white" is true iff snow is white: the metalanguage contains the object language. >Object language, >Meta language. Alternative: an alternative is the canonical translation of meta language to object language. K ripke: in general we let the truth theory itself determine the translation of the object language into the meta language (but not always: more than one formula f can fulfill all criteria). III 338 Homophony/homophone truth theory/Kripke: homophony occurs when the metalanguage contains the object language ("snow is white"/snow is white). >Convention T, >Truth value. III 344 The truth theories of sections 1 and 2 are non-homophone. Section 5: is homophone. III 346 Homophone truth theory: the homophone truth theory is a theory that provides the consequences of the form T(f) biconditional f. Non-homophone truth theory: with a non-homophone truth there we may request an f in the metalanguage at most for each f. This is often more useful than a homophone but it is only useful when the object language is already understood. The non-homophone theory is sufficient for someone’s intuition who does not have the concept yet, but already understands what the truth is in L0. He/she also needs to know the concept of chaining and the referential quantification about expressions. Then he/she can give the truth conditions of the poorly understood language in the language he/she understands. E.g. a Frenchman can give French truth conditions for German that he does not understand well. >Truth conditions. III 358 Homophony: homophony can be made quite mechanically from a non-homophone truth theory. 1) The metalanguage is expanded so that it contains the object language. 2) All findings of the form f biconditional f are added to the old axioms, while f is from the object language and f is its translation into the metalanguage - then, since T(f) biconditional f followed from the old axioms, it follows also from the new ones - that violates Davidson’s claim of the finite axiomatization of truth theory! There are now infinitely many axioms of the form f biconditional f. But there is only a finite number that include T - this excludes a trivial truth theory. III 357 Homophone Truth Theory/Kripke: the homophone truth theory does not provide T(f) biconditional f alone. ((s) The truth of the representing is equivalent to the represented). (DavidsonVs) - ((s) The representing can be a very different chain of characters.) E.g. Kripke: not T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional (x1)(x1 bold), but T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional there is a sequence s such that each sequence s that differs from s at most in the first position, has a bold first element. Problem: how do you decide which sentences show the correct structure? F is not determined here - it differs in any case in the structure and ontology of f. The truth theory does not uncover the structure. >Truth theories._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Kripke I S.A. Kripke Naming and Necessity, Dordrecht/Boston 1972 German Edition: Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 Kripke II Saul A. Kripke "Speaker’s Reference and Semantic Reference", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 2 (1977) 255-276 In Eigennamen, Ursula Wolf, Frankfurt/M. 1993 Kripke III Saul A. Kripke Is there a problem with substitutional quantification? In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J McDowell, Oxford 1976 Kripke IV S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) In Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19