## Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments | |||

| |||

Homophony, philosophy: The special meaning of the concept of homophony in the philosophical discussion about the theory of truth by Tarski is that there must be an additional condition that excludes irrelevant cases. The example "snow is white" is true if and only if snow is white, but it is also true if on the right side of equivalence stands "... if grass is green". This is due to the weak norm of equivalence ("if and only if") which merely requires that both sides are true or both sides are false. The condition of the homophony now requires (a) that the sentence of the left-hand side is repeated on the right-hand side, and (b) that the sentences on both sides come from the same language. See also Theory of truth, truth conditions. _____________ Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||

Author | Item | Summary | Meta data |
---|---|---|---|

Books on Amazon |
EMD II 338 Homophone Truth Theory: "Snow is white" is true iff. snow is white: metalanguage (m.l.) contains the object language (o.l.) - alternative: canonical translation of meta language to object language - Kripke: in general we let the truth theory itself determine the translation of the object language into the meta language (but not always: more than one formula f can fulfill all criteria). --- EMD II 338 Homophony/Homophone Truth Theory/Kripke: Occurs when the metalanguage contains the object language. - "Snow is white"/snow is white). --- II 344 The truth theories of Sections 1 and 2 are non-homophone - Section 5: homophone. --- II 346 Homophone Truth Theory: one that provides the consequences of the form T(f) biconditional f - non-homophone truth theory: here we may request an f in the metalanguage at most for each f - this is often more useful than a homophone: is only useful when the object language is already understood - non-homophone sufficient for someone’s intuition who does not have the concept yet, but already understands what the truth is in L0. He also needs to know the concept of chaining and the referential quantification about expressions. - Then he can give the truth conditions of the poorly understood language in the language he understands. E.g. a Frenchman can give French truth conditions for German that he does not understand well. --- II 358 Homophony: Can be made quite mechanically from a non-homophone truth theory - 1) The metalanguage is expanded so that it contains the object language - 2) all findings of the form f biconditional f are added to the old axioms, while f is from the object language and f is its translation into the metalanguage - then, since T(f) biconditional f followed from the old axioms, it follows also from the new ones - that violates Davidson’s claim of the finite axiomatization of truth theory! There are now infinitely many axioms of the form f bicond. f. - But there is only a finite number that include T - this excludes a trivial truth theory. --- EMD II 357 Homophone Truth Theory/Kripke: does not provide T(f) biconditional f alone - ((s) the truth of the representing is equivalent to the represented). - (DavidsonVs) - ((s) the representing can be a very different chain of characters.) - E.g. Kripke: not T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional (x1)(x1 bold), but T((x1)(x1 bold) biconditional there is a sequence s such that each sequence s that differs from s at most in the first position, has a bold first element - Problem: how do you decide which sentences show the correct structure - f is not determined here - it differs in any case in the structure and ontology of f - the truth theory does not uncover the structure. _____________ Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. |
K I S.A. Kripke Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981 K III S. A. Kripke Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975) InRecent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984 EMD II G. Evans/J. McDowell Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977 Ev I G. Evans The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989 |

> Counter arguments against **Kripke**

> Suggest your own contribution | > Suggest a correction | > Export as BibTeX Datei

Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-22