Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome | |||
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Holism: Holism is the assumption that the elements or the subject domain of a theory are accessible only with simultaneous availability of all elements or objects of this domain. It is also assumed that a change to an element does not exclude changes to all other elements at least. The statement "everything is connected with everything" is however a wrong characterization of the holism, since it is logically erroneous. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
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J. Fodor on Holism - Dictionary of Arguments
IV 41/42 Holism/science/Quine/Fodor/Lepore: if the network metaphor is correct, then there is nothing transtheoretical. Vs: but this is needed for the public nature of the observation. IV 49 Conceptual holism/Fodor/Lepore: assumptions about the necessary relationships between concepts have no psychological consequences, e.g. cat/animal requires nothing for the actual use or for learning (VsConceptual Holism). >Semantic holism. IV 127f Holism/Fodor/Lepore: a functional analysis of the belief can make it holistic but that does not imply conceptual holism, because belief is not a basic concept, but a representation. Thesis: belief holism is secured, conceptual holism is not! IV 129/130 Holism/Fodor/Lepore: intentionality: does not lead to holism (propositional attitudes are not holistic qua intentionality, their semantic properties depend on things which only God knows). Functionalism: leads to holism. >Intentionality. Fodor/LeporeVs: no, because there is no analytic-synthetic distinction. >Analyticity/syntheticity. IV 179 Inferential role/Fodor/Lepore: originally, the attractiveness of the inferenctial role as a causal role consisted in providing a basis for the solution of Brentano's problem of irreducibility to neurophysiology. (>Computation). IV 180 Fodor/Lepore: either one represents the semantics of the conceptual role or one is a holist. >Conceptual role semantics._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F/L Jerry Fodor Ernest Lepore Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992 Fodor I Jerry Fodor "Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115 In Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992 Fodor II Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Fodor III Jerry Fodor Jerrold J. Katz The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71 In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 |