Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Holism: Holism is the assumption that the elements or the subject domain of a theory are accessible only with simultaneous availability of all elements or objects of this domain. It is also assumed that a change to an element does not exclude changes to all other elements at least. The statement "everything is connected with everything" is however a wrong characterization of the holism, since it is logically erroneous.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
I 16 ~
Holism/Esfeld: - E.g. social community: but more than dependence of the thinking of others - social: not rigidly dependent: members die, new come - social role as a business man only as part of the community - generic: any other, but not a certain thing must exist. - not holistic; purely functional characterized systems: e.g. traffic lights also without traffic and vice versa
I 29
Holism/characteristics/Esfeld: not "this individual", not disjoint (e.g. "round or angular") - could be intrinsic or relational (more than causal) - not: "the property to be a system (holistic system)". - Arrangement (causal itself): is not enough, but interaction - relational: there must be at least one thing with which it has no common parts - also to be alone is a relational property/Lewis - holistic properties form family - they do not have to be the same for every part of the system. E.g. Heart/Kidney - holistic properties are relational (arrangement already assumed) - do not have to be intrinsic (e.g. natural numbers).
I 28
Causation: is not enough, even properties which are the cause of things, can be intrinsic - ontological not description dependent - parts: e.g. bones not holistic, but humans for social system - bones do not make up a part for a community - holistic part is not transitive - part more narrow than in mereology.
I 36
Arrangement property: not enough: to be a heart is AE e.g. heart which the butcher sells, otherwise no heart anymore - therefore functional definition no holistic criterion, holistic property cannot be detected in a description which can have the parts in isolation.
I 42
Type A bottom-up: every constituent must have a few holistic properties: every belief is, as far as it has conceptual content dependent on other beliefs (e.g. social holism) - type B: holistic properties primarily belong to the system as a whole: e.g. conceptual content, confirmation, justification (e.g. quantum holism) - semantic holism A or B possible.
I 50
Confirmation holism leads to semantic holism - two dogmas: represents both.
I 366 ~
Holism/Esfeld: can we merge holism of physics and holism of philosophy of the mind? - No: only follow in one area and exclude the other: belief-holism: can only take into account the conceptual area (quasi everyday language), not the quantum mechanical - Quantum holism is fixed on epistemic self-sufficiency and representationalism: epistemic self-sufficiency.: = internalism: belief states independent of physical nature (intentional states can be the same in other environments)
I 383
Holism/tradition: Parmenides, Spinoza, Bradley - Esfeld: retains a revised Cartesianism.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Es I
M. Esfeld
Holismus Frankfurt/M 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-06-02
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