Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Actions, philosophy: Actions are conscious or unconscious human actions as opposed to physical events. The action can take place against the will of the agent, but only if the opposed will is not strong enough to prevent the execution entirely.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
II 294
Action/causation/cause/Nozick: if an action is caused, then by a consideration. - Other way round: which considerations we provide with a causal status depends on how we acted.
II 294
Free will/Nozick: difference:
a) action caused (by reasons, consideration), could have been different
b) causally determined (by intractable things) could not be more different.
II 294
Decision/ethics/Nozick: is not a discovery of weighting, but attribution of relevance - then the decision is not causally determined by the weights - but not every reason is always available to everyone - E.g. history of art: not every style was always available.
II 299
Action/self-subsumtion/Nozick: a decision may be self-subsuming: they can establish principles that govern not only the act but also the weighting itself - this is not a repetition of the weighting - e.g. strategy: that the result is always the best - the decision to follow this strategy itself is an action that falls under the weighting that it attributes.
II 300
The act of decision can also refer to itself.
II 300
Decision/fulfillment model/Herbert Simons: (instead of optimization model): you choose an action that is good enough - if you don’t find one, you continue to look and reduce your expectations - the opnion of what is good enough changes.
Optimization model: here the costs are also taken into account (>self-subsumtion, >self-reference)
a) looking among known alternatives
b) devising new alternatives.
II 304
Reflexive: a free decision is reflexive: it exists by virtue of the weights that are conferred on it by their own validity.
II 318f
Action/decision/free will/knowledge/belief/Nozick: actions and decisions may be seen like beliefs and facts (covariance, connection to facts) - accordingly, methods can be weighed as well.
III 321
Connection: consists in judgmental belief.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

No I
R. Nozick
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981

R., Nozick
The Nature of Rationality 1994

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-07-11
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