|Actions, philosophy: Actions are conscious or unconscious human actions as opposed to physical events. The action can take place against the will of the agent, but only if the opposed will is not strong enough to prevent the execution entirely.|
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Action/causation/cause/Nozick: if an action is caused, then by a consideration. - Other way round: which considerations we provide with a causal status depends on how we acted.
Free will/Nozick: difference:
a) action caused (by reasons, consideration), could have been different
b) causally determined (by intractable things) could not be more different.
Decision/ethics/Nozick: is not a discovery of weighting, but attribution of relevance - then the decision is not causally determined by the weights - but not every reason is always available to everyone - E.g. history of art: not every style was always available.
Action/self-subsumtion/Nozick: a decision may be self-subsuming: they can establish principles that govern not only the act but also the weighting itself - this is not a repetition of the weighting - e.g. strategy: that the result is always the best - the decision to follow this strategy itself is an action that falls under the weighting that it attributes.
The act of decision can also refer to itself.
Decision/fulfillment model/Herbert Simons: (instead of optimization model): you choose an action that is good enough - if you don’t find one, you continue to look and reduce your expectations - the opnion of what is good enough changes.
Optimization model: here the costs are also taken into account (>self-subsumtion, >self-reference)
a) looking among known alternatives
b) devising new alternatives.
Reflexive: a free decision is reflexive: it exists by virtue of the weights that are conferred on it by their own validity.
Action/decision/free will/knowledge/belief/Nozick: actions and decisions may be seen like beliefs and facts (covariance, connection to facts) - accordingly, methods can be weighed as well.
Connection: consists in judgmental belief.
Philosophical Explanations Oxford 1981
The Nature of Rationality 1994