Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| General validity: A. within a calculus a formula that is satisfied by any interpretation (variable assignment with expressions for objects) is valid. See also satisfaction, satisfiability, interpretation.
B.
Validity For Jürgen Habermas, validity refers to the normative standards underlying communicative actions. It involves claims to truth (objective reality), rightness (moral norms), and sincerity (subjective intentions). These validity claims are assessed through rational discourse, aiming for mutual understanding and consensus, forming the basis of his theory of communicative action._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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John R. Searle on Validity - Dictionary of Arguments
V 201 Validity/Urmson: "valid" is a value expression 1. Therefore, it cannot be re-defined descriptively. 2. From the description of a deductive conclusion cannot be shown that it is valid Fallacy of criticism of the naturalistic fallacy of assertiveness/SearleVsUrmson: it is wrong to assume that it is logically impossible to derive a value statement of descriptive expressions. Solution: therefore, by saying that a conclusion is deductive, the criteria for its validity have already been established (that the conclusion follows from the premises). This is a special case: here, there is no logical gap between importance of a value expression and application criteria. >Naturalistic fallacy, >Value judgment, >Criterion, >Deduction, >Induction, >Intensionality._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Searle I John R. Searle The Rediscovery of the Mind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology 1992 German Edition: Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996 Searle II John R. Searle Intentionality. An essay in the philosophy of mind, Cambridge/MA 1983 German Edition: Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991 Searle III John R. Searle The Construction of Social Reality, New York 1995 German Edition: Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997 Searle IV John R. Searle Expression and Meaning. Studies in the Theory of Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1979 German Edition: Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982 Searle V John R. Searle Speech Acts, Cambridge/MA 1969 German Edition: Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983 Searle VII John R. Searle Behauptungen und Abweichungen In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle VIII John R. Searle Chomskys Revolution in der Linguistik In Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995 Searle IX John R. Searle "Animal Minds", in: Midwest Studies in Philosophy 19 (1994) pp. 206-219 In Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005 |
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