|Reason, cause: this is about the possibility or impossibility of equating reasons (for human actions or animal activities) with physical causes. _____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Reason/Cause/Knowledge/Evolution/Dennett: the early doubling macromolecules did have causes, but they had no idea about their reasons.
Cause/existence/ontology/Dennett: there were causes and reasons for millions of years, but no one existed to formulate them, represent the reasons or even to appreciate them in the strict sense.
Brandom I 379
Reason/Davidson/Brandom: reasons are causes - (elsewhere): D. always defines causality as an explanation - we only need causality.
Den I 627
Reason/Darwin/causality/Dennett: Question: can there be reasons which are recognized without a conscious mind recognizing them?.
Yes! Selection is the "blind watchmaker" (Dawkins) , who nevertheless finds forced moves - connection: with truths/Goedel which you can see but cannot prove - Dennett: intermediate solutions are good! E.g. the halting problem: a program that would not perfect but still good._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, New York 1995
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997
Kinds of Minds, New York 1996
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999
"COG: Steps towards consciousness in robots"
Bewusstein, Thomas Metzinger, Paderborn/München/Wien/Zürich 1996
"Animal Consciousness. What Matters and Why?", in: D. C. Dennett, Brainchildren. Essays on Designing Minds, Cambridge/MA 1998, pp. 337-350
Der Geist der Tiere, D Perler/M. Wild, Frankfurt/M. 2005
Making it exlicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge/MA 1994
Expressive Vernunft Frankfurt 2000
Articulating reasons. An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge/MA 2001
Begründen und Begreifen Frankfurt 2001