Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Reasons: In contrast to (physical) causes, reasons are the result of a conscious or unconscious weighing of alternatives.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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III 37
Def Reason/Black: is something-that-is-the-case a circumstance. This serves as a support of what is to be reasoned.
III 38ff
Support/Reasons/Reason/Black: a) material: 1) E.g. everything rests on the earth which itself does not need any support. - 2) we decide here and now whether something is supporting, E.g. by taking away the walls. - 3) in material bodies, mutual support is possible. - b) immaterial: 1) (analog to earth): there may be reasons that do not need support themselves - 2) when a sample is a fact, it does not matter if it is supported by anything. - 3) mutual support: form of thought three sentences, two of which imply the third in each case. - E.g. a = n is a multiple of 6 - b = n is a multiple of 15 - c = n is a multiple of 10.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Bla I
Max Black
Bedeutung und Intention
In
Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, G. Meggle (Hg), Frankfurt/M 1979

Bla II
M. Black
Sprache München 1973

Bla III
M. Black
The Prevalence of Humbug Ithaca/London 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-11-21