Dictionary of Arguments

Screenshot Tabelle Begriffe

 
Author Item Summary Meta data
IV 86
Holism/Radical Interpretation/RI/Davidson/Fodor/Lepore: his argument for holism is based on his assumption that individual sentences - e.g. "Kurt belongs to the German-speaking Community and Kurt holds true: "It is raining on Saturday afternoon and it is indeed raining in Kurt’s area on Saturday afternoon"- lawlike (laws) are - Fodor/LeporeVsDavidson: the generalizations thereof E.g. (x)(t)(if x belongs to the German-speaking community, then (x holds "it s raining" to be true at t if and only if it is raining in the vicinity of x at t) - do not support counterfactual conditionals and therefore, according to Davidson Def law, are not lawlike - no support of counterfactual conditionals E.g. the meaning of "it is raining" could be: "the cat is on the mat" - then it does not follow that the cat is not on the mat when it is not raining.
IV 87
Solution: ...for a relation R and each speaker S... - then nomological - but not yet RI - lawlikeness: we only had to assume it because of the conventionality of language - Problem: the RI cannot find out conventionality by definition.
IV 89
RI/Fodor/Lepore: our image of RI is much richer than that of Davidson.
IV 90
Problem: the nomological approach is not holistic.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

F/L
Jerry Fodor
Ernest Lepore
Holism. A Shoppers Guide Cambridge USA Oxford UK 1992

Fodor I
Jerry Fodor
"Special Sciences (or The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis", Synthese 28 (1974), 97-115
In
Kognitionswissenschaft, Dieter Münch, Frankfurt/M. 1992

Fodor II
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
Sprachphilosophie und Sprachwissenschaft
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995

Fodor III
Jerry Fodor
Jerrold J. Katz
The availability of what we say in: Philosophical review, LXXII, 1963, pp.55-71
In
Linguistik und Philosophie, G. Grewendorf/G. Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1974/1995


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2019-03-20
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