Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Rorty I 145f
Mental States/Searle: the assertion, that mind states could be completely defined by their causal relationships, is for him a pititio principii: "No one has ever regarded his excruciating pain and then came to the conclusion that it is the state of a Turing machine, that could fully be described by its causes and effects."
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Searle I 43
Mind/mental state/Searle: you can accept all of physics, without denying the mind.
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I 87
Ontology/mind state/Searle: always 1st person, always one person’s condition.
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I 28
Mental State/Searle: from the fact that something is mental, it does not follow that it is not physical.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983

Ro I
R. Rorty
Der Spiegel der Natur Frankfurt 1997

Ro II
R. Rorty
Philosophie & die Zukunft Frankfurt 2000

Ro III
R. Rorty
Kontingenz, Ironie und Solidarität Frankfurt 1992

Ro IV
R. Rorty
Eine Kultur ohne Zentrum Stuttgart 1993

Ro V
R. Rorty
Solidarität oder Objektivität? Stuttgart 1998

Ro VI
R. Rorty
Wahrheit und Fortschritt Frankfurt 2000


> Counter arguments against Searle
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23