Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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I 4
Content/Peacocke: mental states have content - sensation: it is fundamental - Experience: is itself a psychological condition in its own right.
I 152
Mental state/Peacocke: to think that it’s cold, does not cause the judgment that it is cold
I 212
Immaterial/material/Peacocke: a mental state may consist in a concentration of any "substance" in neurons, or, otherwise: in a distribution.

Pea I
Chr. R. Peacocke
Sense and Content Oxford 1983


> Counter arguments against Peacocke
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States



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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-29