Perception/McGinn: The perception of yellow depends existentially on what occurs in the neurons of the visual cortex. But it is not true that these neural processes are part of the experience.
Our consciousness states do not have an internal structure that can be defined by their physical foundations.
A state of consciousness does not consist of neural components.
If we assume that all the brain properties are mental (what ever that might mean) this puts us in no more favorable position to explain anything about our familiar impressions and sensations.
The explanatory gap is as wide as ever, except that we now call both sides "mental"._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Die Grenzen vernünftigen Fragens Stuttgart 1996
Wie kommt der Geist in die Materie? München 2001