Mental states/intentionality/Stalnaker: pro pragmatic image: belief contents are coarse grained - understandable in terms of the role in the characterization of actions. - Field: per linguistic image.
Representation/FieldVsStalnaker/Field: we should manage without intrinsically representative mental states.
Non-intrinsical representational states: also have content, can be synonymous. - On the other hand intrinsically representative: E.g. object of believe as an ordered triple from Caesar, Rubicon, Cross.
Possible world/sets of wordls/Field: what is relevant for sets of possible worlds as objects of mental states is that they form a Boolean algebra.
Intentionality/FieldVsStalnaker: we need more than the atomistic approach that everything that satisfies a Boolean algebra is sufficient for the explanation of mental states. (Via sets of possible worlds).
Instead: we need a systematic of the connection of content. - Therefore, we need a more fine-grained structure than that of sets of possible worlds._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980