Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon:
Gareth Evans
Frank I 526
Mental state/inner state/knowledge/Evans: however, the subject can easily acquire knowledge about its inner informational states: it must only re-apply the process of conceptualization.
Fra I 527
But with the former, all knowledge, which does not belong to it, is excluded. The subject tries to determine, how it would judge, if it had no such accompanying information.
The result will necessarily be closely linked to the content of the information state.
But this condition has not become an object!
There is no state of information that is related to the inner state as this internal state is related to that of the world. (> asymmetry, analogy.) (> mind/state of mind)

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977

Ev I
G. Evans
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989

Fra I
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994

> Counter arguments against Evans
> Counter arguments in relation to Mental States

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-23