Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Mind-dependence: Mind-dependence is the philosophical view that the existence or properties of some things depend on the minds of observers. See also Extrinsic, Intrinsicness, Mind, Ontology, Intensions, Meanings, Sense._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hartry Field on Mind-Dependence - Dictionary of Arguments
II 159 Linguistic point of view/Field: The linguistic point of view accepts no meanings as mind-independent entities. - But it attributes words of an interpreter to a speaker's words. The relations are based on different characteristics - i.e. on inferences that contain that word. What I call "meaning characteristic". >Belief attribution. E.g. Tip brackets: same meaning characteristic then (by inference) as my actual use of "rabbit". - They are adopted without presupposing any intentional entities. >Gavagai/Field, >Quotation marks, >Description levels, >Language use._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Field I H. Field Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989 Field II H. Field Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001 Field III H. Field Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980 Field IV Hartry Field "Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 |
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> Counter arguments against Field
> Counter arguments in relation to Mind-Dependence
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-18