|Counterpart: in the philosophy of David K. Lewis a counterpart is an object in a possible world, which corresponds to an object in our world - the actual world. For David Lewis no object is in more than one world. Therefore, he must accept counterparts. The counterparts may correspond exactly to the objects in our actual world or deviate more or less strongly from them. See also counterpart theory, counterpart relation, possible worlds, modal realism, actualism._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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|I Kripke passim
Counterparts (Lewis) are qualitatively determined - KripkeVs: possible worlds are not qualitatively determined, but fixed (such as counterfactual, cannot be explored)._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Name und Notwendigkeit Frankfurt 1981
S. A. Kripke
Outline of a Theory of Truth (1975)
Recent Essays on Truth and the Liar Paradox, R. L. Martin (Hg), Oxford/NY 1984