Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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II 71
Possible objects: A real color or a real place do not need to occur at all times. Just as little a real man must live forever. (>real >reality).
II 72
Object: not time-place, but "total object" p + t, parts no relationship to each other. Just as the parts of two cars on two sides of the street form no car. (Similar to Quine)
II 72f
The predicate "time-place" applies to many objects which consist of a place and a time, but not to all, for example, not to t+p.
II 73f
Possible objects/Goodman: real objects smaller subclass of the possible - "possible time-place" no new real object but new predicate for old real sum object p + t - The predicate "time-place" does not apply to p + t. - Similar to "biggt" and "flexible": p + t = "time-place-able".
II 74
Continuation/predicates statement: "Time-place is red": two continuations: it continues the two predicates "red" and "time-place" on p + t.

The possible objects and predicates disappear. Predicates refer to reality, but have extensions that are related in a very specific way with the extensions of certain manifest predicates and are usually further.

N. Goodman
Weisen der Welterzeugung Frankfurt 1984

N. Goodman
Tatsache Fiktion Voraussage Frankfurt 1988

N. Goodman
Sprachen der Kunst Frankfurt 1997

N. Goodman/K. Elgin
Revisionen Frankfurt 1989

> Counter arguments against Goodman
> Counter arguments in relation to Object

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-23