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|I 16 ff
Thought/Knowledge/DavidsonVsHume: there are infinitely many properties, so ignorance of the imagined objects is possible
... it is necessary to find objects for which mistakes are impossible. As objects that are necessary what they seem to be.
DavidsonVsDescartes: 1. such objects simply do not exist. Not even appearances are all what they seem to be. Also, the aspects of sense data cannot be protected against misidentification, insofar as they are real objects.
We must drop the idea that there are inner objects or mental images in the required sense.
No "internal objects", no "uninterpreted given", "no stream" within a schema (VsSchema/content).
Frank I 678
Objects/Putnam/Fodor: a) "true inward", "in front of the mind", "conceived" by him - b) those who identify thoughts in the usual way. (external) - Davidson: I agree that there are no objects that serve both purposes - ((s) not an excellent class). - Putnam: the two cannot coincide, because otherwise the mind could not be deceived.
Ideas/impressions/Hume: "are as it seems and seem as it is" - DavidsonVsHume: such objects do not exist - neither abstract nor concrete, neither public nor private. Even propositions do not exist - there is no object that would satisfy the dual function to be in front of the mind and also to determine the content of the thought - otherwise one could not be deceived. - meaning depends on the types of objects and events which have caused the person acausally to take the words as applicable. But the agent cannot ask himself whether he regularly applies them correctly, because his regularity gives them importance. - Thus, authority of the first person and social character go hand in hand._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Der Mythos des Subjektiven Stuttgart 1993
Handlung und Ereignis Frankfurt 1990
Wahrheit und Interpretation Frankfurt 1990
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994