Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
| |||
|
| |||
| Object: The object in philosophy is anything that can be thought about or talked about. It can be concrete or abstract, and it is often contrasted with the subject, which is the being that is doing the thinking or talking. See also Subject, Subject-Object Problem, Objects (Material things)._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
| Author | Concept | Summary/Quotes | Sources |
|---|---|---|---|
|
D.M. Armstrong on Object - Dictionary of Arguments
Martin III 178f Object/Martin: Objects are simple - even spread objects are possible, but not completely constituted by present awareness of place and time (spatial property is not sufficient). Universals/Armstrong: Universals are simply fully constituted in each instantiation. MartinVs: that is mysterious. Martin III 180 Complex object/MartinVsArmstrong: complex objects can be distributed: "what-it-is-and-what-it-is-not". - That is possible, but unlike a universal. - In all these distributed objects there is a difference between more or less "actually contained things" and that is not allowed for Armstrong._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Armstrong I David M. Armstrong Meaning and Communication, The Philosophical Review 80, 1971, pp. 427-447 In Handlung, Kommunikation, Bedeutung, Georg Meggle, Frankfurt/M. 1979 Armstrong II (a) David M. Armstrong Dispositions as Categorical States In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (b) David M. Armstrong Place’ s and Armstrong’ s Views Compared and Contrasted In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (c) David M. Armstrong Reply to Martin In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Armstrong II (d) David M. Armstrong Second Reply to Martin London New York 1996 Armstrong III D. Armstrong What is a Law of Nature? Cambridge 1983 Martin I C. B. Martin Properties and Dispositions In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin II C. B. Martin Replies to Armstrong and Place In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin III C. B. Martin Final Replies to Place and Armstrong In Dispositions, Tim Crane, London New York 1996 Martin IV C. B. Martin The Mind in Nature Oxford 2010 |
||
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-19