Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference.
 
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

 
Books on Amazon
Dum III 133
Sense/Frege/Dummett: Sense is constituted by the way of givenness - it is not identical with it.
A propos Frege II 40
Ways of Givenness/(s): Not a sign - because identity does not say anything about (contingent) signs). >Identity
Frege I 128
Ways of Givenness/Way of being given/Frege: e.g. "square root of 1": Concept -> Identity (see above) constitutes that one and the same object corresponds to two ways of givenness - not simply two (arbitrary) signs.

F I
G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

F II
G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

F IV
G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-25