|Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Books on Amazon:
|Frank I 485 f.
Here/Evans: no intension - "here"-thoughts are no particular manner of presentation, but represent as many places as there are._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
G. Evans/J. McDowell
Truth and Meaning Oxford 1977
The Varieties of Reference (Clarendon Paperbacks) Oxford 1989
M. Frank (Hrsg.)
Analytische Theorien des Selbstbewusstseins Frankfurt 1994