|Way of givenness, manner of presentation, philosophy: expression from G. Frege for distinguishing meaning (in Frege's sense of meaning that upon which a term refers - today "reference") and the sense (in Frege's use of the term, what we today call "meaning"). The givenness depends both on the circumstances and the individual language use. Carnap introduces the concept of "intension" for the way of givenness. See also intensions, extensions, propositions, propositional attitudes, improper speech, proper speech, improper sense, proper sense, meaning, reference._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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Understanding/Grasping: an object must be grasped in a certain way, the sense not - we can not take it all at once.
Grasp: does not determine the truth value but the truth conditions.
Sense/Frege/Dummett: constituted by givenness - not identical to it._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982