|Given, philosophy: something in the outside world, which should correspond to what we perceive through the senses. It is problematic how to distinguish the constitution of external objects from what is determined by the construction of our sense organs. The presupposition of a given, also assumes that both this and the side of the perceiving subject are fixed in a certain way. This is doubted by many authors.See also reality, myth of the given, perception, world, world/thinking, thing in itself, perspective, nature, naturalism, epistemology._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Given/Givenness/Field: it is not clear what it means for a situation to be "given". - Which is linguistics- and theory-dependent.
Problem: there is no way to describe a situation in which the relation - "double distance" and (P3) "MG Eu (u is a matter particle and u is between x and y and xuCuy and uyCzw and the spatial relationships between x, y, z and w are the same as they actually are)" diverge - Spelling: C: congruent.
Problem: if we define "triple distance" according to (P3), we have to show that the distance is not at the same time twice and three times. - Then we need Substantivalism or Heavy-Duty Platonism._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.
Realism, Mathematics and Modality Oxford New York 1989
Truth and the Absence of Fact Oxford New York 2001
Science without numbers Princeton New Jersey 1980
"Realism and Relativism", The Journal of Philosophy, 76 (1982), pp. 553-67
Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994