Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Dummett I 62
Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: Sensations - but not: meaning. thoughts: grasping of external things
Dummett I 19
Thought/Thinking/Frege: Thought not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts possible without linguistic cover.
- - -
Frege II 47
Frege: A sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - thought is the same, whether reference ("meaning") or not.
Thought: sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: progress from thought to its truth value.
II 71
Truth Value: A truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object. (Truth value = object)
II 76
Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under".
Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together.
- - -
Dummett I 32
Frege: grasping the thought: psychic act - thought is not the content of consciousness.-
Consciousness is subjective - thought objective. - WittgensteinVs.
Frege IV 52
Thought/Frege: not a complete thought without a time determination. - But then it is timelessly true or false.
Expression/Assertion/Frege: difference: time determination: belongs to the expression - truth: belongs to assertion and is timeless. - Timeless things are not part of the external world.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff
Thought/Frege: not sentence meaning (reference), because possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). - Sense of the sentence: the expressed thought (abstract).
Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object).
Thought/Frege: abstract - Contradiction: content, idea.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff
Odd Meaning/Frege: expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content).
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff
Thought/Identity Criterion for Thoughts/Frege/St: Sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: thought identity) Invariant: the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is the element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A.
Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68
Thought/Frege/St: is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

G. Frege
Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987

G. Frege
Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

Du I
M. Dummett
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992

M. Dummett
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

G. Frege
Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993

R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz
Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995

R. Stuhlmann Laeisz
Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2018-06-25