Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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G. Frege on Thoughts - Dictionary of Arguments
Dummett I 62 Consciousness Content/Frege/Dummett: the content of consciousness are sensations but not meaning. Thoughts: thoughts are the grasping of external things. Dummett I 19 Thought/Thinking/Frege: thought is not identical with the meaning of the sentence - beings with identical thoughts are possible without linguistic cover. - - - Frege II 47 Frege: a sentence about a non-existent unicorn is without truth value, predicates cannot be attributed or denied - the thought is the same, whether there is reference ("meaning") or not. Thought: is a sentence without truth value (because "meaning" (reference) is unresolved) - the same thought in an actor without meaning - judgment: is progress from thought to its truth value. >Fregean sense, >Fregean meaning. II 71 Truth Value: a truth value cannot be one part of a thought, as little as the sun can, because it is not a sense, but an object (truth value = object). >Truth value, >Object. II 76 Thought: one part must be unsaturated, as a binding agent, e.g. "falls under". Thought: not all parts of the thought may be complete, at least one should be unsaturated (predicative), otherwise they would not stick together. Dummett I 32 Frege: grasping the thought: is psychic act. The thought is not the content of consciousness. Consciousness is subjective, the thought is objective - WittgensteinVs. >">Objectivity. - - - Frege IV 52 Thought/Frege: there is not a complete thought without a time determination. But then it is timelessly true or false. Expression/assertion/Frege: there is a difference: time determination belongs to the expression whereas truth belongs to assertion and is timeless. Timeless things are not part of the external world. >Truth, >Timelessness. --- Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 47 ff Thought/Frege: a thought is not the sentence meaning (reference), because it is possible common property of many thinkers (content, objective). Sense of the sentence: is the expressed thought (abstract). Unequal content: sense can be grasped without knowing whether the sentence has a meaning (reference, existing object). Thought/Frege: a thought is abstract. Contradiction: content, idea. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 57ff Odd Meaning/Frege: odd meaning refers to the expressed thoughts - (thought: abstract, unequal content). Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 66ff Thought/identity criterion for thoughts/Frege/St: sentence A contains the same idea as sentence B, if (i) the assumption that A and B lead to a contradiction - (ii) vice versa - that allows us to conceive thoughts as invariant abstractions - (>partial identity: identity of thoughts) Invariant: is the thought. The thought contained in a sentence is what element A has in common with all the propositions which are logically equivalent to A, and that changes when we move on to a proposition B which is not logically equivalent to A. Stuhlmann-Laeisz II 68 Thought/Frege/St: a thought is that element of an assertion that can be true or false, and which is the object of the believing-to-be-true of epistemic subjects. >Propositions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
F I G. Frege Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik Stuttgart 1987 F II G. Frege Funktion, Begriff, Bedeutung Göttingen 1994 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 Dummett I M. Dummett The Origins of the Analytical Philosophy, London 1988 German Edition: Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992 Dummett II Michael Dummett "What ist a Theory of Meaning?" (ii) In Truth and Meaning, G. Evans/J. McDowell, Oxford 1976 Dummett III M. Dummett Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (a) Michael Dummett "Truth" in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 59 (1959) pp.141-162 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (b) Michael Dummett "Frege’s Distiction between Sense and Reference", in: M. Dummett, Truth and Other Enigmas, London 1978, pp. 116-144 In Wahrheit, , Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (c) Michael Dummett "What is a Theory of Meaning?" in: S. Guttenplan (ed.) Mind and Language, Oxford 1975, pp. 97-138 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (d) Michael Dummett "Bringing About the Past" in: Philosophical Review 73 (1964) pp.338-359 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 Dummett III (e) Michael Dummett "Can Analytical Philosophy be Systematic, and Ought it to be?" in: Hegel-Studien, Beiheft 17 (1977) S. 305-326 In Wahrheit, Michael Dummett, Stuttgart 1982 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 F IV G. Frege Logische Untersuchungen Göttingen 1993 SL I R. Stuhlmann Laeisz Philosophische Logik Paderborn 2002 Stuhlmann II R. Stuhlmann-Laeisz Freges Logische Untersuchungen Darmstadt 1995 |
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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16