|Thought, philosophy: a thought corresponds to a complete sentence. There is debate about whether we can attribute such thoughts to animals. See also mentalism, mental states, opacity, thinking, reality, world/thinking, propositional attitudes, propositions, intensions, objects of thought, relation theory, mentalese, computation._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
Frege: Thought not the same as sense of the sentence - creatures with identical thoughts without linguistic manifestation possible.
I 32 f
Frege/thought: According to Frege the thought - the content of the act of thinking - is not part of the stream of consciousness.
Frege capturing the thought: mental act - thought not content of consciousness - consciousness subjective - thought objective - WittgensteinVs
Frege: Thoughts are objective, ideas are not. - If it were otherwise, we could never disagree.
I 194 ff
Thoughts/DummettVsFrege: not necessarily linguistic: Proto-thoughts (also animals) (associated with activities) - Proto-thoughts instead of Husserl s noema.
A thought cannot be detected otherwise than as a complex. Evans: "generality condition": "This rose smells sweet" - no one who is unable to have other thoughts regarding this rose can have the thought or who does not understand what smelling sweet is. (Dummett pro).
Grasp: does not determine the truth value, but the truth conditions._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Ursprünge der analytischen Philosophie Frankfurt 1992
Wahrheit Stuttgart 1982