|Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. |
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John R. Searle
|Dennett I 557
Function/Searle: (according to Dennett): only products that were produced by a real human consciousness, have a function (> objet ambigu, P. Valéry).
DennettVsSearle: therefore the wings of the aircraft serve to fly, but not the wings of the eagle.
SearleVsFunctionalism (SearleVsPutnam) relationships between mind states are not only causal. Otherwise stones would have the same mind states like us with the right causal relations.
I 59 ff
VsFunctionalism: eliminates qualia - imitation of a functional organization does not result in pain sensation.
Machine is defined by effects, cannot be recreated from cheese - Computer: is syntactically defined, can be rebuild by anything (cats, mice, cheese) - Syntax is always relative to the observer. Not intrinsical - but heart is an intrinsical pump - also water is describable as intelligent (lowest resistance).
Intentional phenomena: rule consequences: genuine causal phenomena - Functional explanation: only bare physical facts, causality only through interest-oriented description here - rules are no cause for action.
Function/Searle: has no separate layer.
Pattern: plays a causal role in functional terms, but does not guarantee unconscious representation. (Intentionality)
SearleVsMillikan: function is always relative to the observer (only "flow" immanent) - Millikan: function arose evolutionary._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983
Darwins gefährliches Erbe Hamburg 1997
Spielarten des Geistes Gütersloh 1999