Philosophy Dictionary of Arguments

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Functionalism, philosophy of mind: the thesis that mind states are functional states that can be described by input and output. See also identity theory, mind-body-problem, materialism, physicalism, mental states.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

Author Item Summary Meta data
Pauen I 67
Multiple realizability: a variety of neural activity can cause one and the same mental state. (E.g. -Split Brain: takeover by other areas). Problem for the identity theory and materialism
I 130
Def Semantic functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: reverts exclusively to everyday language behavioural vocabulary.
I 132
Functionalism/Lewis/Pauen: Vs multiple realization (if the roles are determined accurately enough.) - That distinguishes him from most other functionalists.
I 135f
Psycho-functionalism/Pauen: responds to the shortcomings of everyday language in determining mental states. - The functional description can be pushed to an individual neuron. - Representative: Dennett: VsEveryday psychology: Problem: how to recognize simulation.

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
The note [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition.

Pauen I
M. Pauen
Grundprobleme der Philosophie des Geistes Frankfurt 2001

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> Counter arguments in relation to Functionalism

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2020-09-24
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