Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Presentism: Presentism in economics refers to the tendency to evaluate past economic events, policies, or theories solely through the lens of present knowledge, values, or circumstances._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Derek Parfit on Presentism - Dictionary of Arguments
Norgaard I 339 (Def) Presentism/Political philosophy: Presentism is a moral framework that is implicitly adopted by climate economists such as Manne (1995)(1), Nordhaus (1992(2), 2008)(3), and Anthoff et al. (2009b)(4). In this perspective, policy decisions should be based strictly on the preferences of the current generation with no explicit moral standing afforded to members of future generations. The rub is that presentism implies that the Norgaard I 340 weight attached to the welfare of future generations should be based strictly on the degree of altruism that people exhibit through their private decisions (Arrow et al. 1996)(5). Advocates of presentism attach special importance to the market rate of return on capital investment, which they argue reveals people's willingness to give up present economic benefits for the sake of their children and grandchildren (Goulder and Stavins 2002)(6). Pro Presentism/Nordhaus: Nordhaus (1992(7), 2008(3)), for example, has long advocated a presentist approach in which major reductions in greenhouse gas emissions should be deferred into the long‐run future. In Nordhaus's analysis, the future benefits provided by climate stabilization are too small to justify imposing significant short‐run costs given the degree of intergenerational altruism people reveal through their private decisions. VsPresentism: One line of critique argues that the market return on capital investment reveals the preferences that people hold regarding their own present and future well‐being, not the conceptually distinct values they hold regarding the appropriate resolution of intergenerational conflicts (Burton 1993)(8). In the economic models employed by presentists, these two behavioral motives are typically reduced to a single parameter for the sake of tractability and simplicity. VsVs: Authors such as Howarth and Norgaard (1992)(9), however, argue that this modeling approach is theoretically unsound and that fresh insights arise through the use of models that distinguish between personal time preference and intergenerational ethics. VsPresentism: (…) critics also charge that presentism involves the unjust treatment of posterity because it denies the principle that all human beings—including members of future generations—should have full and equal moral standing (Broome 2008)(10). Along these lines, Singer (2002: 26)(11) argues that the moral salience of impacts such as ‘suffering and death, or the extinction of species’ does not diminish with the passage of time. In a similar vein, Ramsey (1928)(12) argues that favoring the interests of present over future generations is ‘a practice which is ethically indefensible and arises merely from the weakness of the imagination.’ PresentismVsVs: Advocates of presentism, however, counter that the strength of intergenerational altruism has been sufficient to ensure that the quality of life has steadily improved in the centuries following the industrial revolution. If one assumes that economic growth will Norgaard I 341 continue for some time into the future, it follows that our descendants in future generations are likely to be substantially more wealthy than we are today. VsPresentism: (…) climatic impacts may be severe enough to threaten the sustainability and productivity of economic activity (Hoel and Sterner 2007)(13). This point of view is supported by the findings of Woodward and Bishop (1997)(14), Weitzman (2009)(15), and Gerst et al. (2010)(16). Pro Presentism/Parfit: More radically, authors such as Parfit (1983a)(17) question the notion that present decision makers have any obligations to future generations aside from ensuring that future persons have lives that are minimally worth living. (…) suppose that wholly different sets of potential persons would live in: (a) a low‐income future characterized by a degraded natural environment; and (b) a high‐income future characterized by a flourishing environment. Parfit's argument is that the individuals living in the degraded state would be thankful for the fact that present decisions fostered the conditions necessary for them to come into being. Steps to stabilize climate would (…) lead to a different world in which they would never be born. VsParfit: “Our obligations to future generations derive from a sense of a community that stretches and extends over generations and into the future…If one accepts the idea of a community in one generation, including the principle that this entails certain obligations to other members, then one should accept the idea of a transgenerational community extending into the future, hence recognizing obligations to future generations.” (De‐Shalit 1995: 14–15)(18). VsParfit/VsPresentism: Alternatively, Gosseries (2008)(19) notes that Parfit's argument abstracts away from a key fact of human demographics: At each point in time, the current generation of adults overlaps with its children and grandchildren whose existence and identities are fully determined. If one accepts the plausible premise that each generation of adults holds binding duties to its flesh‐and‐blood progeny, a ‘chain of obligation’ is then established between present decision makers and the unborn members of more distant generations (Howarth 1992)(20). >Generational Justice, >Climate Change/Utilitarianism. 1. Manne, A. S. 1995. The rate of time preference: Implications for the greenhouse debate. Energy Policy 23: 391–4. 2. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19. 3. Nordhaus, W. 2008. A Question of Balance: Weighting the Options on Global Warming Policies. New Haven: Yale University Press. 4. Anthoff, D. Tol, R. S. J. and Yohe, G. W. 2009b. Risk aversion, time preference, and the social cost of carbon. Environmental Research Letters 4: 1–7. 5. Arrow, K. J., Cline, W. R., Mäler, K. G., Munasinghe, R., Squitieri, R., and Stiglitz, J. E. 1996. Intertemporal equity, discounting, and economic efficiency. In J. P. Bruce, H. Lee, and E. F. Haites (eds.), Climate Change 1995: Economic and Social Dimensions of Climate Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 6. Goulder, L. H., and Stavins, R. N. 2002. An eye on the future. Nature 419: 673–4. 7. Nordhaus, W. D. 1992. An optimal transition path for controlling greenhouse gases. Science 258: 1315–19. 8. Burton, P. S. 1993. Intertemporal preferences and intergenerational equity considerations in optimal resource harvesting. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 24: 119–32. 9. Howarth, R.B. and Norgaard, R. B. 1992. Environmental valuation under sustainable development. American Economic Review 80: 473–7. 10. Broome, J. 2008. The ethics of climate change. Scientific American 298: 97–102. 11. Singer, P. 2002. One World: The Ethics of Globalization. New Haven: Yale University Press. 12. Ramsey, F. 1928. A mathematical theory of saving. Economic Journal 38: 543–59. 13. Hoel, M., and Sterner, T. 2007. Discounting and relative prices. Climatic Change 84: 265–80. 14. Woodward, R. T., and Bishop, R. C. 1997. How to decide when experts disagree: Uncertainty‐based choice rules in environmental policy. Land Economics 73: 492–507. 15. Weitzman, M. L. 2009. On modeling and interpreting the economics of catastrophic climate change. Review of Economics and Statistics 91: 1–19. 16. Gerst, M., Howarth, R. B., and Borsuk, M. E. 2010. Accounting for the risk of extreme outcomes in an integrated assessment of climate change. Energy Policy 38: 4540–8. 17. Parfit, D. 1983a. Energy policy and the further future: The identity problem. In D. MacLean and P. G. Brown (eds.), Energy and the Future. Totowa, NJ: Rowman & Littlefield. Pp. 166–179. 18. De‐Shalit, A. 1995. Why Posterity Matters: Environmental Policies and Future Generations. London: Routledge. 19. Gosseries, A. 2008. On future generations' rights. Journal of Political Philosophy 16: 446–74. 20. Howarth, R. B. 1992. Intergenerational justice and the chain of obligation. Environmental Values 1: 133–40. Howarth, Richard: “Intergenerational Justice”, In: John S. Dryzek, Richard B. Norgaard, David Schlosberg (eds.) (2011): The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society. Oxford: Oxford University Press._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Parf I D. Parfit Reasons and Persons Oxford 1986 Parf II Derekt Parfit On what matters Oxford 2011 Norgaard I Richard Norgaard John S. Dryzek The Oxford Handbook of Climate Change and Society Oxford 2011 |
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> Counter arguments against Parfit
> Counter arguments in relation to Presentism
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-16