Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Formal speech: expression of R. Carnap (R. Carnap, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften, Hamburg, 2005 p. 120). In the formal manner of speech it comes to rules on the use of linguistic expressions and to the question of which inferences are allowed in order to build new statements. For example, it's not about whether two expressions mean the same thing, but whether they are mutually substitutable. See also formal language, Content speech, ideal language, artificial language, everyday language.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
I 25
Formal speech/Carnap: solution for "x is neither a fact nor a falsehood" - "x" does not name an object. - Nothing is named by a true sentence (equally not by a that-clause) - Prior per, but for a different reason than why "Pegasus" nothing shall appoint - ((s) > Quine relative clause = general term.)

Pri I
A. Prior
Objects of thought Oxford 1971

Pri II
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003

> Counter arguments against Prior

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-05-26