|Formal speech: expression of R. Carnap (R. Carnap, Scheinprobleme in der Philosophie und andere metaphysikkritische Schriften, Hamburg, 2005 p. 120). In the formal manner of speech it comes to rules on the use of linguistic expressions and to the question of which inferences are allowed in order to build new statements. For example, it's not about whether two expressions mean the same thing, but whether they are mutually substitutable. See also formal language, Content speech, ideal language, artificial language, everyday language._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.|
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Formal speech/Carnap: solution for "x is neither a fact nor a falsehood" - "x" does not name an object. - Nothing is named by a true sentence (equally not by a that-clause) - Prior per, but for a different reason than why "Pegasus" nothing shall appoint - ((s) > Quine relative clause = general term.)_____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.
Objects of thought Oxford 1971
Arthur N. Prior
Papers on Time and Tense 2nd Edition Oxford 2003