Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

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Bat example, philosophy: (Literature Th Nagel, What is it like to be a bat, Philosophical Review 83 (October). 435-50 (1974).) While most people believe to be able to imagine how it would be for them to be a bat, according to Nagel this is not the point. The problem is that we cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. See also subjectivity, objectivity, privileged access, introspection, imagination.

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Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.

 
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Books on Amazon
I 137
Bat: Problem: how it is for the bat, not how it is for us! - Features: it is about which features there are - not about what we know about them- epistemology/ontology - 1st -person features are different from 3rd Person-features - a full neurophysiological theory is not enough, not about sensation.


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Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

S I
J. R. Searle
Die Wiederentdeckung des Geistes Frankfurt 1996

S II
J.R. Searle
Intentionalität Frankfurt 1991

S III
J. R. Searle
Die Konstruktion der gesellschaftlichen Wirklichkeit Hamburg 1997

S IV
J.R. Searle
Ausdruck und Bedeutung Frankfurt 1982

S V
J. R. Searle
Sprechakte Frankfurt 1983


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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-10-19