Philosophy Lexicon of Arguments

Bat example, philosophy: (Literature Th Nagel, What is it like to be a bat, Philosophical Review 83 (October). 435-50 (1974).) While most people believe to be able to imagine how it would be for them to be a bat, according to Nagel this is not the point. The problem is that we cannot imagine what it is like for a bat to be a bat. See also subjectivity, objectivity, privileged access, introspection, imagination.

Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments.
Author Item Excerpt Meta data

Books on Amazon
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Bat Example/disjunctive properties/identity theory/Putnam: Theory 1: Fl: disjunctive property P1 or P2, disjunctive property P ’1 or P "2 U (Assuming each correlation) - Theory 2: identity instead of correlation - correlation to complex property P1 or P2 or P ’1 or P "2 - N.B.: both theories lead to the same predictions of normal as of abnormal observers - stones always have the disjunctive property "sensation or no sensation".

Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution.

Pu I
H. Putnam
Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt Frankfurt 1993

H. Putnam
Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999

H. Putnam
Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997

H. Putnam
Pragmatismus Eine offene Frage Frankfurt 1995

Pu V
H. Putnam
Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990

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Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2017-06-26